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ED

28 March 1958

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

28 March 1958

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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[redacted]  
Soviet leadership: Khrushchev now holds the top positions in both party and government as Stalin did. Although he does not yet dominate the Soviet scene to the same degree, he has reached the pinnacle more rapidly than Stalin. As in Stalin's day, Soviet policy will reflect to a great extent the personality of the leader. [redacted]


25X1A  
Soviet submarines for Egypt: Three Soviet W-class long-range submarines and one mine sweeper, which left the Baltic on 18 March, probably entered the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar on 27 March. If, as expected, the submarines are to be turned over to the United Arab Republic, they could arrive in Alexandria on about 4 April. [redacted]

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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[redacted]


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no

Watch Committee conclusion - Indonesia: The general Indonesian situation increasingly favors the local Communist position and provides expanding opportunities for exploitation by the Sino-Soviet bloc through aid and propaganda, although there is no evidence of Sino-Soviet intention to become militarily involved. The Djakarta government has had considerable military success on Sumatra against the dissidents, but a resolution of the basic issues is not an early prospect.

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
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no

Watch Committee conclusion - Middle East: A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is considered unlikely in the near future. Serious incidents could arise, however, from continuing tensions in the area.

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no


\*Tunisia - France: President Bourguiba has told Ambassador Jones that he will not accept Gaillard's demand that a neutral commission be permitted to supervise the Tunisian side of the Algerian border. Gaillard told the good offices mission on 25 March that France would accept with slight modifications some earlier proposals agreed to by Bourguiba, but only if Bourguiba accepted some form of

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international border control commission. Bourguiba now  
is expected to press for UN action. [REDACTED]  
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### III. THE WEST

*no*  
France - disengagement: Despite the opposition of  
French Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry specialists,  
Foreign Minister Pineau appears intent on exploring pos-  
sibilities for "disengagement" in central Europe, ultimate-  
ly involving mutual troop withdrawal. He will probably try  
to sound out Chancellor Adenauer and other officials in  
Bonn on 28 March, although Bonn has repeatedly denounced  
such ideas. Pineau, who is a perennial seeker after "more  
flexible" Western policies on grounds of their propaganda  
value, may be counting on tacit support from London for  
his current effort. [REDACTED]

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*OK*

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[REDACTED]

## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev Assumes Soviet Premiership

With the assumption of the Soviet premiership, Khrushchev becomes officially the chief executive of both government and party and adds control over the execution of policy to his already established authority in policy formulation. Besides increasing the dominance of the Communist party over the Soviet state, Khrushchev has taken into his own hands more power than any man has held since Stalin's death. In so doing he has delivered the final blow to the myth of collective leadership and has taken the risks of being accused of becoming a latter-day Stalin.

As premier and party chief Khrushchev will be able to speak with undiluted authority in any high-level international negotiations, but this seems hardly the primary reason for assuming the additional burdens of office and the liabilities inherent in a further seizure of power. He undoubtedly chafed under committee rule, however weighted in his favor in the past, as a system which was too cumbersome and produced too many restraints and compromises for his impatient nature.

Khrushchev can be expected to delegate many of the day-to-day chores of his new office, and for this reason further changes in the Council of Ministers will probably take place during the current Supreme Soviet session. The key posts of defense and foreign affairs will, however, probably not be affected.

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Tunisian President Refuses to Meet French Demand on  
Frontier Commission

President Bourguiba told Ambassador Jones on 26 March that he could make no further concessions to the French point of view, particularly with regard to the frontier. Premier Gaillard had on 25 March agreed to proposals, with minor modifications, of the good offices mission providing Bourguiba agreed to have a neutral commission supervise the Tunisian side of the Algerian border.

Bourguiba argued that virtually all concessions obtained by the good offices mission had come from him, and that the only practical importance of a frontier commission would be to permit France to say it had forced another concession from him. He added that acquiescence would alienate the Algerian rebels, whom he has tried to influence to accept a moderate position, and drive them closer to Nasir, and "all the free world would lose."

Bourguiba, who has been strongly criticized by the extreme wing of his party for not having pressed his case in the UN Security Council, now is expected to press for UN action. [redacted]

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[redacted]



### III. THE WEST

#### French Foreign Minister Trying to Line up Support For "Disengagement"

French Foreign Minister Pineau has apparently overruled specialists in the Foreign and Defense Ministries in order to push a plan for "disengagement" in central Europe. When Pineau visits West German Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn on 28 March, he is expected to sound Adenauer out on a proposal which calls for elimination of strategic missiles in central Europe, followed successively by elimination of tactical missiles and by mutual troop withdrawal. The fact that Bonn has already indicated its disapproval of such ideas may not deter Pineau, who apparently has been influenced by a report from his fellow Socialist, French disarmament expert Jules Moch, that British Foreign Secretary Lloyd is interested in a demilitarized zone along the demarcation line in Germany. Some French Foreign Ministry officials, who have expressed concern over Lloyd's "softness" and its impact on Pineau, are still trying to quash Pineau's plan.

Regardless of Bonn's reaction, Pineau is likely to pursue his efforts to achieve disengagement by proposals he hopes will interest Moscow. Since he became foreign minister in 1956, Pineau has frequently taxed the Western alliance with "rigidity" in dealing with the problem of East-West relations, and has cited the need, from the French domestic political viewpoint, to counter the Communists' pose as sole champions of peace. [REDACTED]

25X1A [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
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25X1A [REDACTED]

25X1D [REDACTED]

25X1D [REDACTED]

25X1A [REDACTED]

Watch Committee conclusion - Middle East: A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is considered unlikely in the near future. Serious incidents could arise, however, from continuing tensions in the area. [REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED]

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